Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held a summit on May 21, 2025, to discuss various issues, including the critical matter of Palestinian armed groups operating within Lebanese territory. The high-level meeting between President Aoun and President Abbas occurred amid ongoing concerns regarding the presence and activities of these groups, which have long posed challenges to Lebanon's sovereignty and internal security. The summit aimed to address the complexities surrounding these factions and their armaments. Among these groups, Hamas's primary weapons are reportedly concentrated in Rashidieh camp, located south of the Litani River. These armaments are said to include Grad rockets, noting the significant firepower some of these groups possess. The continued presence of such weaponry in civilian areas raises serious questions about stability and the potential for escalation.
Disarmament Efforts Stall
Significant progress has been made in disarming certain Palestinian factions, particularly those affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Since August 2025, the Lebanese Army has taken possession of a significant portion of the medium and heavy weapons belonging to PLO factions. Approximately 60 percent of these armaments have been handed over to Lebanese authorities, marking a substantial step towards consolidating state control over weaponry. This disarmament process saw Fatah al-Intifada, a prominent faction, begin transferring its heavy and medium weapons to the Lebanese Army at Beddawi camp in northern Lebanon a month before August 30, 2026. This move by Fatah al-Intifada set a precedent for other groups to follow, contributing to the broader disarmament efforts.
The disarmament efforts by factions such as Fatah al-Intifada, Al-Sa'iqa, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command were significantly influenced by a shift in their external support. These three Syria-linked factions lost their Syrian political and military backing following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The change in Syrian sponsorship has created an environment conducive to these specific groups reducing their weapon caches within Lebanon, as their strategic and logistical lifelines were severed. This shift in regional alliances and support structures proved to be a critical factor in encouraging their compliance with disarmament demands. The absence of a patron state to supply and protect their arsenals diminished their capacity and willingness to maintain extensive military capabilities within Lebanese borders.
Hamas and Hezbollah Link
However, not all Palestinian factions have been amenable to disarmament. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other allied factions rejected the resolutions of the Lebanese-Palestinian summit held on May 21, 2025. This rejection notes deep-seated divisions within Palestinian groups operating in Lebanon regarding the issue of disarmament, complicating national efforts to assert full control over all armed entities. The broader landscape of Palestinian armed forces in Lebanon is generally divided into three main groups, each with distinct allegiances and operational priorities. These groups include factions affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and factions linked to the former Syrian regime. This tripartite classification shows the fragmented nature of Palestinian military presence in Lebanon and the varied challenges each group presents to the Lebanese state.
Most of the remaining weapons belonging to PLO factions are small arms, following disarmament efforts that saw a significant portion of their medium and heavy weaponry transferred to the Lebanese Army. This contrasts sharply with other groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that have maintained larger and more sophisticated arsenals, including rockets and other heavy weaponry. The classification of Palestinian armed entities into these three categories shows the complexity of managing their presence and weaponry within Lebanese territory, particularly given the differing levels of cooperation and external influence each group experiences. The ongoing presence of heavily armed non-state actors remains a significant point of contention and a source of instability.
Official and Factional Views
Beyond Lebanon's borders, international pressure for disarmament continues. US President Donald Trump announced at the end of July that the “Board of Peace” he chairs had reached an agreement calling for the “full disarmament” of Hamas and other armed groups in the Gaza Strip. The announcement by President Trump signals an external push for disarmament, focusing on a different theatre of Palestinian operations than those in Lebanon. This broader international attention on Palestinian armed groups shows ongoing regional and international concerns regarding their presence and armaments, emphasizing a global desire for stability and the demilitarization of non-state actors. The international community views the unchecked proliferation of weapons in the hands of such groups as a threat to regional peace.
In Lebanon, the Lebanese Army has taken direct action against certain factions. The Lebanese Army took control of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command positions in Qusaya and Sultan Yacoub, including their weapons, equipment, and rockets, at the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025. This decisive action by the Lebanese Army directly addressed the disarmament of specific Palestinian factions within Lebanese territory, demonstrating the state's resolve to enforce its authority. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command is one of the factions linked to the former Syrian regime, alongside Fatah al-Intifada and Al-Sa'iqa. These actions by the Lebanese Army are key steps in asserting state sovereignty and reducing the overall number of armed groups operating outside official control, contributing to the long-term goal of a stable and secure Lebanon.
